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1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
under the federal securities laws than adequate disclosure of the
transaction, the problems created by a corporation going private have
only recently become acute. In response to the controversy, the Com-
mission has proposed two alternative rules to regulate going private
transactions." Consequently, the possibility still exists that the ine-
quities engendered by going private may be controlled under the
existing provisions of the federal securities laws.
VII. SECTION 16(b)
A. Introduction
To prevent insiders from profitably misusing corporate informa-
tion,' § 16(b) 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 permits the
corporation to recover insider profits on purchases and sales of the
corporation's securities. Two presumptions created by the section aid
663, 699-705 (1974).
1 The rules, Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, basically require disclosure of certain infor-
mation when an issuer intends to go private. Rule 13e-3A requires that the price offered
for such securities must be "fair" as determined by two independent experts. Rule 13e-
3B contains the same general fairness and disclosure requirements, but is of somewhat
more limited scope and does not provide for fair market value determination by inde-
pendent experts. The proposed rules will be considered and discussed during hearings
conducted by the SEC for the purpose of investigating going private transactions. The
hearings are to be held in April, 1975. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (February
6, 1975).
For a discussion of the legislative history of § 16(b), see Note, 32 WASH. & LEE
L. Rav. 699, 708-10 (1975).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) provides that the corporation or one of
its shareholders may sue any statutory insider, an officer, director, or beneficial owner
of more than ten percent of a class of the corporation's equity securities, for any profits
realized on any pair of purchasing and selling transactions in the corporation's securi-
ties within a six month period. Shares acquired in connection with a previously con-
tracted debt are exempt from the section. The section does require, however, that the
ten percent owner be such at both the purchasing and selling transactions. No similar
requirement applies to an officer or director. It is important to note that § 16(b)
purchasing and selling transactions may be in any order. See Provident Sec. Co. v.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 610 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W.
3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-742).
3 15 U.S.C. 99 78a-78hh (1970). One of the purposes of the 1934 Act is to regulate
the practices employed in trading the securities subject to the Act. Such regulation
"is designed to protect the investing public by maintaining fair and open markets for
the buying and selling of securities. . . .." Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under
the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 385 (1953). The legislative history of §
16(b) includes H.R. RP. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. Nos. 792,
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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the plaintiff in establishing his case. First, a corporate insider is
presumed to have access to inside information.4 Second, he is pre-
sumed to have misused this information if he conducts profitable
purchasing and selling transactions within a six month period. In
spite of these presumptions, however, the section does not provide
automatic recovery in all instances of insider trading. Problems arise
in determining who is an insider, what transactions are sales and
purchases, and whether the presumptions of access to inside informa-
tion and concurrent abusive use are conclusive in all cases.'
B. Section 16(b) Insiders
A § 16(b) insider includes any officer, director,7 or beneficial
owner of more than ten percent of any class of a corporation's equity
securities registered under the 1934 Act.8 By broadly interpreting the
definition, the courts have attempted to include within the scope of
the section as many cases of insider abuse as possible.
(1). Directors
In cases involving directors, the courts have held that a defendant
need not have been a director at the time of both the purchase and
sale transactions allegedly yielding profits recoverable under § 16(b).1
Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-742).
506 F.2d at 611. Note, Securities Exchange Act Section 16(b): Fourth Circuit
Harvests Some Kernels of Gold, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 852, 856 (1974); Comment,
Section 16(b): An Alternative Approach to the Six-Month Limitation Period, 20 U.C.
L.A. L. REV. 1289, 1295-96 (1973). The presumption of actual abuse can be rebutted
in some instances, however. E.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1973).
1 For practical guides to § 16(b)'s application, see Deitz, A Practical Look at
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 1 (1974); Lang and
Katz, Section 16(b) and "Extraordinary" Transactions: Corporate Reorganizations
and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 705 (1974).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)-(b) (1970).
In Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1969), the defendant purchased
securities of a corporation of which he later became a director. Subsequent to his
becoming a director, and within six months of the purchase, the defendant sold his
securities at a profit. The court found that although § 16(b) requires that a ten per-
cent beneficial owner be such at both the purchase and sale transactions, there was
no similar requirement for officers and directors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). This
reasoning, coupled with the broad remedial purpose of the section, led the court to
conclude that the defendant should be held liable. Accord, Marquette Cement Mfg.
Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
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Recently, however, a district court decision, Lewis v. Varnes," con-
firmed that the defendant must be a director at the time of at least
one of the transactions. The Lewis defendant had received stock op-
tions while an officer and director of the issuing corporation but did
not exercise the options until retirement from these positions. Thus
the purchase of the securities and their sale less than six months later
occurred after the defendant had ended his insider status. Following
an earlier district court decision,' the Lewis court did not allow re-
covery of the defendant's profits."
A second fact situation involving definitional problems arises
when one spouse who is a corporate director purchases or sells the
corporation's securities within six months of a sale or purchase in the
same securities by the nondirector spouse. In the 1974 case Whiting
v. Dow Chemical Co.," a director of Dow exercised options to pur-
chase the company's shares less than six months after his wife sold a
portion of her own Dow holdings. To determine whether the profits 4
were recoverable under § 16(b), the district court applied tests set
forth in a SEC Release which specified when one spouse would be
considered the beneficial owner of the other spouse's securities for the
purpose of the § 16(a) reporting requirements. 5 The court found that
1036 (1970) presented the reverse fact situation. The director resigned from the corpo-
ration's board prior to the sale of stock which was within six months of a pre-
resignation purchase. The court found that there was a potential for abusive use of
inside information by a director who resigned before the final transaction and that §
16(b) liability should therefore attach. Id. at 268. But see Comment, Stock Exchanges
Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale"? 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 1034, 1041-42 n.39 (1969).
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,343 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,343 at 95,159.
13 Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,923 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
24, 1974) (Director Whiting sought a declaration of whether he was liable under § 16(b)
and Dow counterclaimed for his profits).
" The alleged profits resulted when Mrs. Whiting sold her shares at a higher price
than that paid by her husband when he exercised the stock options. Id. at 97,174.
" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966) provides:
Generally a person is regarded as the beneficial owner of securities
held in the name of his or her spouse .... Absent special circum-
stances such relationship ordinarily results in such person obtaining
benefits substantially equivalent to ownership, e.g., application of the
income derived from such securities to maintain a common home, to
meet expenses which such person otherwise would meet from other
sources, or the ability to exercise a controlling influence on the pur-
chase, sale, or voting of such securities. Accordingly, a person ordinar-
ily should include in his reports filed pursuant to Section 16(a) securi-
ties held in the name of a spouse ....
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although Mr. and Mr. Whiting maintained separate investment ac-
counts, they did communicate concerning financial matters and
acted together when joint transactions were beneficial. In addition,
the nondirector spouse paid some of the family expenses from her
investment profits. The court concluded that the close connection
between the spouses' investments was sufficient to make the director
spouse the beneficial owner of his wife's shares for § 16(a) purposes
and, by analogy, for § 16(b) purposes as well. Thus Dow could
recover the profits on the sale and subsequent purchase of the corpo-
ration's shares.
The result seems proper because the Whitings' discussion of fin-
ancial matters, when coupled with their joint transactions in the
past, made it possible for the couple to carry out short swing trades
based on inside information. However, courts deciding cases in the
future should not interpret the Whiting court's use of the SEC Re-
lease tests to mean that a director spouse's liability may be founded
solely on his enjoyment of the nondirector spouse's investment prof-
its. Before allowing § 16(b) recovery, a court should find some indica-
tion that the corporate insider could communicate nonpublic infor-
mation to his spouse who in turn could act on the basis of that
information. 7 A showing that the defendant merely enjoyed the prof-
its of his spouse's investments would not sufficiently demonstrate a
possibility of misuse of inside information. 8
(2). Ten Percent Beneficial Owner
The term "such beneficial owner" in § 16(b) 9 is defined in § 16(a)
as every person who is the beneficial owner of more than ten percent
of any class of the corporation's equity securities registered under the
11 Compare Blau v. Potter, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,115 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citation omitted) (no § 16(b) liability where husband's and
wife's estates were organized and managed separately and wife made no contribution
to family expenses).
11 Provident Sec. Corp. v. Foremost-McKesson Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 612-14 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-742).
11 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), see note 15
supra, indicates that an insider spouse would be required to report the outsider
spouse's stock ownership even if the only connection between the spouses' investments
was a sharing of the profits for the benefit of the family. It should be noted, however,
that § 16(a), to which Release 7793 pertains, has a broader scope than § 16(b). Thus,
a defendant might not be liable under § 16(b) for profits resulting from transactions
involving his spouse's shares even though he has reported beneficial ownership of the
shares pursuant to § 16(a). See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7824 (Feb.
14, 1966).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
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1934 Act.2" To be liable for his profits under § 16(b), however, the
defendant must have been such a beneficial owner both at the time
of the purchasing and the selling transactions." The question arose
in early § 16(b) cases whether the transaction creating beneficial
ownership would also serve as a § 16(b) purchase. Judge Kaufman
applied what has become the majority rule in Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp. ,2 deciding that in order to prevent most of the abuses
which the section was designed to check, the statutory phrase "at the
time of' must be interpreted to mean ten per cent ownership created
simultaneously with the first § 16(b) purchase."
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit in Provident Securities
Corp. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc." departed from the Stella rule,
holding that § 16(b) liability could be imposed only upon persons who
were ten percent owners prior to the first § 16(b) transaction. The
court reasoned that the abuse which Congress intended § 16(b) to
check was insider misuse of corporate information to carry out profit-
able short term buying and selling by which the insider does not
20 Id. § 78p(a).
21 Id. § 78p(b).
2" 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), remanded, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
21 The Stella rule was intended to prevent a person from purchasing a large block
of stock, then selling down to bring his ownership below ten percent, and then repeat-
ing the process. 104 F. Supp. at 959 Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 612, 631-32 (1953). The Stella rule controls
in most courts. E.g., Colonia Realty Corp. v. MacWilliams, 381 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 372 F. Supp 570, 576
(N.D. Ill. 1974).
214 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18,
1975) (No. 74-742).
On September 25, 1969, Provident Securities agreed to transfer most of its assets
to Foremost-McKesson in exchange for cash and convertible debentures. The agree-
ment was closed on October 15. On October 21, Provident signed an agreement with
an underwriter to sell about half of the debentures it received from Foremost at a profit
to Provident of $366,666.66. Provident distributed the remaining debentures to its
shareholders on October 24, and at that time ended its beneficial ownership of more
than ten percent of a class of Foremost equity securities. Finally, on October 28, the
underwriter agreement signed on October 21 was closed and Provident received pay-
ment for the debentures sold.
The initial question for the court was whether the October 21 underwriter agree-
ment or the October 28 closing date was the sale date of the Foremost debentures. The
question was crucial to Provident's § 16(b) liability because Provident was a ten per-
cent owner on October 21, but not on October 28.The court held the October 21 date
to be the sale date and then proceeded to the question of whether the exchange of
Provident's assets for Foremost debentures, which made Provident a ten percent
owner, could also be a § 16(b) purchase.
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intend to alter his longterm investment in the corporation's securi-
ties." Since § 16(b) creates a conclusive presumption that an insider
intended to speculate in short swing transactions,26 the section should
apply only to insiders who probably would have access to inside infor-
mationY Unless a person is an officer or a director, he is not pre-
sumed to be an insider under the section until he owns more than ten
percent of a corporation's securities.28 Thus the transaction which
created ten percent ownership could not have been carried out on the
basis of information received because the person was an insider.
2 9
Therefore, the Provident Securities court held that to be liable under
§ 16(b), the defendant must have been a ten percent owner prior to
the first § 16(b) transaction. However, to prevent ten percent owners
from speculating by selling their holdings to less than ten percent
and then repurchasing on the basis of inside information, the court
interpreted "at the time of" to mean ten percent ownership existing
simultaneously with the last transaction.2
The Ninth Circuit's restrictive interpretation of "at the time of"
is consistent with the views of those commentators who advocate
limiting the scope of § 16(b).31 The opportunities for misuse of inside
information inherent in some transactions which would be excluded
' The court noted that "[t]he section was directed against an insider who has
no intention of changing his investment relationship to the corporation, but rather has
an 'intention or expectation' to purchase and sell the stock within six months." 506
F.2d at 609. See Comment, Section 16(b): An Alternative Approach to the Six-Month
Limitation Period, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1289, 1296-97 (1973); Note, Insider Liability
for Short Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72
MICH. L. Rxv. 592, 598-607 (1974).
26 506 F.2d at 611.
v Id. at 612.
- Id. at 609, 614.
21 Id. The court noted that a transaction may be based on inside information
received by means other than a person's inside relationship to the issuer corporation.
Presumably, such an abuse of inside information would be actionable under Rule 10b-
5. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38
(2d Cir. 1974).
11 The first transaction may be either a purchase or a sale and the second transac-
tion a sale or a purchase. See note 2 supra.
31 According to one writer, "There is no longer any reason for the federal courts to
be harsh and objective in interpreting and applying section 16(b). Everything that this
section was designed to accomplish, and much more, is presently being accomplished
under section 10(b) and rule lob-5." Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regu-
lating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. Rav. 45, 63 (1968). See also Comment, Reliance
Electric, Occidental Petroleum, and Section 16(b): Interpretive Quandary Over
Mergers, 51 TEx. L. REv. 89, 99-100 (1972); Note, Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litiga-
tion: A Return to the Objective Approach?, 58 VA. L. Rgv. 907, 915 (1972).
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from the scope of § 16(b) by the Provident Securities rule make the
wisdom of such a limitation questionable, however. In Newmark v.
RKO General, Inc. ,3 for example, the defendant RKO made a single
purchase of securities of Central Airlines, a corporation which
planned to merge with Frontier Airlines, a subsidiary controlled by
RKO.33 Following the Stella rule,- the court held that the purchase
made RKO owner of more than ten percent of Central's shares and
was therefore a § 16(b) purchase which could be matched with a sale
less than six months later.3 The result in Newmark was consistent
with the policy of foreclosing the potential for speculative abuse,
because RKO's inside position in Frontier gave it access to nonpublic
information of Central while the two airlines were negotiating a
merger agreement." Under the Provident Securities rule, however,
the acquisition of Central shares could not have been a § 16(b) pur-
chase because RKO was not a ten percent owner prior to the transac-
tion. Thus the Ninth Circuit's rule would exclude from the scope of
§ 16(b) some transactions which might involve an insider's profitable
misuse of nonpublic information.
Presumably, RKO coud have been held liable under § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-537 if the plaintiff could have demonstrated misuse of inside
information. The presumptions in favor of a § 16(b) plaintiff, how-
ever, make the elements of a Rule 10b-5 suit and a § 16(b) case very
different. Under § 16(b), the defendant is presumed to have access
to inside information which he intends to misuse if he carries out
purchase and sale transactions within six months." In contrast, the
Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must show scienter," possession of undisclosed
material inside information by the defendant, and the abusive use of
this inside information to the plaintiff's harm.4 Since one of the
primary purposes of the 1934 Act is to maintain fair and open markets
- 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
3Id. at 351-52.
u See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
5425 F.2d 355-56.
3, Id. at 353-54.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
See notes 2, 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
The presumption of abuse is not conclusive in cases involving unorthodox trans-
actions. See note 5 supra.
,0 The courts disagree on the meaning of scienter, but it would seem that in most
federal circuits today, more than negligence is required. See notes 2-3 and accompany-
ing text at 750-51.
," See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974).
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by forbidding trading on nonpublic information,42 it would seem pre-
ferable that transactions such as those in Newmark and Provident
Securities remain within the scope of § 16(b), thereby facilitating
private suits to enforce the Act's policies.
C. Purchase and Sale
To be liable under § 16(b), a defendant must have engaged in at
least two transactions which entailed the purchase and sale of securi-
ties. 3 Where the transaction in question involves the exchange of
securities for cash a purchase or sale clearly has taken place. How-
ever, when the transaction consists of an unorthodox event such as
an exchange of stock pursuant to a merger agreement or the conver-
sion of one security into another," the problem arises of determining
whether the transaction is either a § 16(b) purchase or sale.
Early cases interpreted the terms "purchase"4 and "sale"4
broadly. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte," for example, held that a
conversion of preferred stock into common constituted a purchase of
the common which could be matched with a later sale. However, this
broad interpretation of the statutory language included within the
scope of § 16(b) some unorthodox transactions which could not have
involved misuse of inside information. Thus, to avoid "purposeless
harshness" resulting from a mechanical application of § 16(b), many
courts determined whether a transaction could be used for specula-
tive purposes before allowing recovery. This refinement, which has
42 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). E.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
44 In addition to merger exchanges and conversions, the Supreme Court in Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), mentioned as
constituting unorthodox transactions exchanges pursuant to corporate reorganizations,
"stock reclassifications and dealings in options, rights and warrants." Id. at 593 n.24.
The list of unorthodox transactions is probably not all-inclusive, however. Provident
Sec. Corp. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-742). See 2 L. Loss, SECURMEs
REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961).
11 The 1934 Act defined "purchase" as "any contract to buy, purchase, or other-
wise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(13) (1970).
11 The term "sale" includes "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Id. §
78c(14).
11 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). See 17 C.F.R. §
240.16b-9 (1974).
" For a summation of the history of the objective approach to § 16(b), see, e.g.,
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
Most of the circuit courts, with the notable exception of the Third Circuit, Heli-Coil
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been termed the subjective approach in contrast to the automatic,
objective approach of Park & Tilford, was approved by the Supreme
Court in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp."
Before applying § 16(b), the Kern court used a two-part test to deter-
mine if the unorthodox transaction50 involved presented an opportun-
ity for abuse.51 The Court inquired first whether the defendant had
access to inside information of the plaintiff corporation" and second,
whether the defendant had enough control over the transaction in-
volved to allow it to misuse undisclosed information profitably. Find-
ing neither part of the test met, the Court affirmed the Second Cir-
cuit's holding for the defendant. 4
How courts apply the Kern test for ascertaining whether an unor-
thodox transaction5 is a § 16(b) purchase or sale will determine
Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), have adopted the subjective approach.
E.g., Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, - U.S. _, 95 S.
Ct. 134 (1974). The Supreme Court has approved the subjective method, Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), thereby making the
Third Circuit's holding questionable. Several law review articles have examined the
reasons behind the objective and subjective approaches. E.g., Bateman, The Prag-
matic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for Clarification, 45 ST. JOHNS L.
REV. 772 (1971); Weinstock, Section 16(b) and the Doctrine of Speculative Abuse: How
to Succeed in Being Subjective without Really Trying, 29 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1974).
4 411 U.S. 582 (1973). See, e.g., Note, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 149 (1973);
Note, Insider Liability for Short Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the
Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REV. 592 (1974); Note, Kern County Land Company
v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation: An Approach to 16(b), 28 Sw. L.J. 487 (1974).
411 U.S. at 593-96.
5' The case arose out of Occidental's attempted takeover of Kern by a tender offer
to Kern's shareholders. The tender offer failed, however, and Kern defensively merged
with Tenneco Corporation. To rid itself of the Tenneco stock which it would receive
pursuant to the Kern-Tenneco merger agreement exchange, Occidental gave Tenneco
an option to purchase the Tenneco shares. The option granted to Tenneco could not
be exercised, however, until six months after the exchange of Kern shares for Tenneco.
Thus, there was no cash sale in question. 411 U.S. at 584-89. The plaintiff, however,
argued that the option agreement or the subsequent exchange of shares pursuant to
.he merger agreement was a § 16(b) sale which could be matched with the tender offer
purchase.
52 411 U.S. at 598; Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
- U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 134 (1974).
0 411 U.S. at 599, 602. See Note, Securities Exchange Act Section 16(b): Fourth
Circuit Harvests Some Kernels of Gold, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 852, 869 (1974).
51 The Court found that the antagonism between Occidental and Kern foreclosed
any access by Occidental to inside information of Kern. 411 U.S. 598-99, 601-02.
Further, the Court held that neither the exchange of Kern shares for Tenneco nor the
option agreement was sufficiently controlled by Occidental to offer possibilities for the
type of speculation which § 16(b) was intended to proscribe. 411 U.S. at 599, 601-02.
Although § 16(b) liability attaches automatically to allow the issuing corpora-
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whether the test becomes, in essence, a case by case approach which
permits an examination of the facts for actual abuse thereby weaken-
ing the § 16(b) presumptions in favor of the plaintiff and severely
reducing the section's deterrent effect." In the 1974 case Makofsky v.
Ultra Dynamics Corp.,". a district court eschewed any inquiry into
the actuality of the defendant's misuse of inside information. Instead,
it interpreted the Kern test as providing that:
[T]he principal inquiry in a pragmatic [subjective] analysis
is whether the transaction in issue could possibly tend to ac-
complish the practices § 16(b) was designed to prevent ....
The indices of such a possibility are access to inside informa-
tion (as distinguished from possession of it), and the ability to
influence the timing and circumstances of the transaction in
issue."5
The facts in the Makofsky case were complex,"9 but essentially
tion to recover all profits resulting from orthodox sales and purchases within the
statutory six-month period, it is not always clear what transaction in a series of busi-
ness events is the orthodox sale or purchase. E.g., Lewis v. Realty Equities Corp.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. % 94,459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Moreo-
ver, the difficulties involved in sorting out the legal obligations in such transactions
are compounded by the courts' use of a speculative abuse test to determine the date
of the orthodox transaction. Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). Because it is similar to the speculative abuse test
used in cases involving unorthodox transactions, the Booth test can lead to decisions
in which it is not clear whether the court believed the transaction to be orthodox or
unorthodox. See Champion Homebuilders Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1974).
" The Kern Court indicated that in situations involving unorthodox transactions,
the courts should examine each case on its own facts in deciding if a possibility for
abuse existed. See Note, Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 291, 297-98
(1973). If, however, the courts go so far as to examine each fact situation for actual
abuse, the courts could come close to searching for an intent to speculate, an inquiry
foreclosed by the statute. See Comment, Non-Cash Exchange Pursuant to a Defensive
Merger, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 361-64 (1974). A case by case approach which involves
an examination of actual abuse would dilute the deterrent effect of the section. Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 612 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Insiders, believing that they could distinguish the facts of their cases
from those involved in past cases in which liability was imposed would be tempted to
carry out the transaction and then litigate the question of liability. See 2 L. Loss,
SECURMIES REGULATION 1043 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Securities Exchange Act Section
16(b): Fourth Circuit Harvests Some Kernels of Gold, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 852, 859
(1974); Note, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 149, 161-62 (1973).
383 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Id. at 638 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Makofsky court also
put the Kern test in the conjunctive; both indices must be met before a transaction
will be defined as a purchase or a sale. Id. at 640.
51 Ultra Dynamics acquired shares of Avis Industrial Corporation pursuant to
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involved an acquisition of shares by an aggressor corporation followed
by -a sale within six months. The sale was prompted, however, not by
a defensive merger of the target corporation, as in Kern," but by the
aggressor corporation's inability to finance the purchase. Holding the
transaction to be unorthodox,' the Makofsky court applied its ver-
sion of the Kern test and found that Ultra, the aggressor, had access
to inside information of the target Avis Corporation not only because
the intercorporate antagonism which had characterized the Kern
case " was absent, but also because Ultra had two designees on the
Avis board. 3 Moreover, the court found that Ultra had some control
over the sale of Avis stock as well as alternatives to selling, thereby
creating the possibility that Ultra could use inside information in
selling the stock." Thus both elements of the Kern test, access to
three agreements: (1) a purchase of Avis Corporation treasury stock, (2) a purchase of
the bulk of the shares of Avis, the majority shareholder, and (3) an option to purchase
the rest of Avis' shares at $12 per share. Ultra completed the first two transactions but
was unable to raise the money necessary to pay for the shares received. To protect its
position, however, Ultra exercised the option and then, still unable to finance the
purchases, sold all of its Avis Corporation shares at $16 each. The plaintiff sued under
§ 16(b) for the difference between the purchase price of the option shares and their
sale price. 383 F. Supp. at 634-36.
0See note 51 supra.
'1 383 F. Supp. at 637.
12 See note 54 supra.
3 383 F. Supp. at 634. The court held that the designees' knowledge of inside
information should be imputed to Ultra. The court did not address the question of
whether Ultra had "deputed" these designees. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403
(1962) (no "deputing"); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969)
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970) ("deputing").
" The court analyzed the facts in two stages. First, it found that Ultra was not
compelled to purchase the last lot of shares under the option agreement. Unlike the
Kern defendant, 411 U.S. at 597-98, Ultra was in a position to weigh the alternatives
to purchasing because it had access to inside as well as public information. 383 F.
Supp. at 641. Second, the Makofsky court held that Ultra was not forced to sell the
Avis stock. Not only could Ultra have foreseen the possibility that it would not receive
the financing which it had expected, Ultra had other alternatives. Moreover, it had
some bargaining power in the final agreement which it made to dispose of the Avis
stock. The court concluded that Ultra had sufficient control over the circumstances
and timing of the sale to meet the Kern test. Id.
The Makofsky court's application of the Kern test was broader than the Supreme
Court's application of the standard in Kern. There was evidence that Occidental had
access to some inside information of Kern. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323
F. Supp. 570, 575 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.), af'd, 411 U.S.
382 (1974). Moreover, it would seem that Occidental could have waited to grant an
option for the Tenneco shares until the six month period had expired. See note 51
supra. The Kern court, however, focused on the terms of the option rather than the
alternatives to it. 411 U.S. at 601-02.
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inside information and sufficient control over the sale to allow misuse
of inside information, were satisfied. In essence, § 16(b) retained
much of its mechanical character in Makofsky. The court's interpre-
tation of the Kern test required an examination of the facts, not to
find whether Ultra actually abused its insider position, but rather, to
determine if the transaction could have been profitably misused by
the corporate insider.
In another recent case involving an attempted merger, American
Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.," the Second Circuit was not so auto-
matic in its application of the Kern test. The defendant Crane, after
unsuccessfully proposing a merger to the management of Westing-
house Air-Brake Company, acquired Air-Brake stock both in the
market and by tender offer. Although Air-Brake fought Crane's ac-
tion and negotiated a defensive merger with American Standard,
Crane continued to fight for control of Air-Brake by extending the
duration of its tender offer. Crane's plan failed, however, and Air-
Brake merged with American Standard. Crane remained only a mi-
nority holder of Air-Brake common, and therefore received shares of
American Standard preferred pursuant to the merger agreement.
Shortly after the merger, Crane sold the preferred shares, prompting
Amercan Standard to sue for Crane's prdfits in its dealings in Air-
Brake and American Standard stock.6
American Standard argued that three sets of transactions could
be considered § 16(b) purchase and sale events. First, Crane's pur-
chases"7 of Air-Brake common could be matched with its disposal of
the common in the merger exchange. Second, Crane's acquisition of
American Standard preferred pursuant to the merger agreement
could be matched with the cash sale of these shares less than six
months later. Finally, Crane's purchase of Air-Brake common could
be matched with its sale of American Standard preferred." Thus, two
questions were posed: could the exchange of Air-Brake common for
American Standard preferred be considered either a sale of the com-
mon or a purchase of the preferred and, could the purchase of one
corporation's stock be matched with the sale of another corporation's
securities for § 16(b) purposes.
In resolving both questions, the Second Circuit applied the Kern
subjective test which it interpreted as requiring an inquiry (1)
13 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,924 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 1974).
" Id. at 97,181-83.
" All of Crane's purchases of Air-Brake could be considered § 16(b) purchases
because the first purchase made Crane a ten percent owner. Id. at 97,181, 97,184.
Id. at 97,184.
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whether there was likelihood of access by Crane to inside information
due to its ownership of more than ten per cent of Air-Brake's common
and (2) whether Crane could have controlled the events surrounding
the merger. 9 The exchange of Air-Brake common for American Stan-
dard preferred, the court concluded, offered no potential for abuse
under the Kern test due to the antagonism between the managements
of Air-Brake and Crane. Crane's inability to control the merger
events was shown by its inability to prevent the Air-
Brake-American Standard combination.7" Therefore, the exchange
of shares was neither a purchase nor a sale under § 16(b).
Whether Crane's purchases of Air-Brake common prior to the
merger could be matched with its post-merger sale of American Stan-
dard preferred was a novel question in § 16(b) litigation. The court
found that if the section were read literally it would not include such
a transaction. The language of § 16(b) refers only to one issuer, thus
implying that to be liable, a ten percent owner must have access to
inside information of the same issuer at both the purchase and sale.7
When Crane purchased Air-Brake common, it gained no access, even
by statutory presumption," to inside information of American Stan-
dard.3 The court found support for this literal reading of the statute
in the legislative history of the section which indicated a congres-
sional intent to prohibit profitable misuse of inside information of the
corporation issuing the shares involved. To allow American Standard
to recover on the basis of a purchase which made Crane a statutory
insider of Air-Brake but not of American Standard would not redress
any misuse of American Standard inside information, but would pro-
vide a windfall for the suing corporation. Moreover, a holding that
a purchase of Air-Brake common could not be matched with a sale
of American Standard preferred would probably not remove from the
scope of § 16(b) those transactions in which an insider could profita-
bly misuse corporate information. 5 On the other hand, to promote
the tender offer method of corporate acquisition would benefit the
" Id. at 97,187-88.
7o Id. at 97,188. The court did not decide whether American Standard's contention
that Crane's chairman had access to inside information of Air-Brake should change
its holding; Standard introduced evidence of such access at too late a point in the trial.
Id. at 97,183, 97,188-89.
T' Id. at 97,190.
Section 16(b) creates the presumption that a ten percent owner has access to
inside information. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
" CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,924, at 97,191.
71 Id. at 97,192-93.
15 Id. at 97,193-94.
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stockholders of the target corporation."
American Standard, therefore, in conjunction with Kern indicates
that a company may attempt a tender offer takeover of another cor-
poration without incurring undue risks of § 16(b) liability. If the
aggressor corporation succeeds it may retain the acquired stock to
maintain control of the target corporation, thereby avoiding a § 16(b)
sale. If the aggressor company fails due to the opposition of the target
corporation and its defensive merger with a third company, the de-
feated aggressor may dispose of the shares within six months of their
purchase. Under Kern, it may grant an option to sell the stock and,
following American Standard, it may actually sell the shares. Thus
the courts have not actively discouraged tender offer schemes to gain
control of corporations."
The tender offer method of corporate acquisition is not entirely
free from the risk of § 16(b) liability, however. Makofsky8 demon-
strates that if the takeover scheme fails for some reason other than
target corporation opposition, the courts may find a possibility of
access to inside information and enough potential control over the
events surrounding the attempted takeover to impose § 16(b) liabil-
ity. Similarly, in cases in which the tender offer succeeds, the courts
may find opportunities for speculative abuse and allow recovery if the
acquiring company disposes of the shares which it purchased within
six months of their acquisition.79 Thus the tender offer purchase of a
corporation could present expensive § 16(b) problems for the aggres-
sor company.0 Moreover, because the subjective approach usually
76 The tender offer benefits the target corporation shareholders by giving them the
choice of selling out of a corporation with which they are dissatisfied at an advanta-
geous price or of remaining in the corporation, which, if the tender offer is successful,
may receive new, more progressive management. Id. at 97,186-87.
"The tender offer appears to be an economically advantageous method for one
corporation to acquire another. See Comment, Reliance Electric, Occidental Petro-
leum, and Section 16(b): Interpretive Quandary over Mergers, 51 TEx. L. REv. 89, 103-
05 (1972).
I8 383 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See notes 57-64 and accompanying text
supra.
1, Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970) (access of parent-aggressor corporation to inside information of target corpo-
ration during merger negotiations between subsidiary and target corporations created
potential for speculative abuse). See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
90 Section 16(b) litigation can be expensive not only due to attorney's fees. Most
of the courts have adopted an arbitrary "high-low" method of calculating § 16(b)
damages. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943). Thus liability under the section could involve much more than
the return of profits as determined by standard accounting methods.
